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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
Issue 1: Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review a final order of 
permanent total disability in favor of Mr. Albert. This Court reviews 
questions of law for correctness, granting no deference to the Court of 
Appeals' conclusions. Morton Inf 1, Inc., v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 
581, 588 (Utah 1991). 
Issue 2: Where Ameritemps stipulated to a final order of permanent total disability 
and failed to challenge the stipulation, can Ameritemps challenge appellate 
jurisdiction where that challenge depends on the unappealed facts of its 
stipulation. Standard of Review: This Court reviews factual challenges 
under a substantial evidence standard, where the parties challenging the 
facts must marshal the evidence. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah Tax Comm 'n., 
858 P.2d 1381,1383 (Utah 1993). Preservation for Review: Ameritemps 
never challenged the facts of its stipulation, and therefore did not preserve 
this issue for review. 
Issue 3: Whether tentative findings of permanent total disability, which are not 
"final orders" under the statute, can be nonetheless appealed in violation of 
the plain language of the statute, contrary to injured employees' right to a 
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speedy remedy, and in derogation of the legislature's serial multiple hearing 
scheme. Standard of Review: This Court's interpretation of the statute is 
strictly a legal issue, and the Court of Appeals' opinion is entitled to no 
deference. Morton Int'l Inc., v. State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 588 
(Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Johnny Albert ("Mr. Albert) was seriously injured in four separate industrial 
accidents over the span of seven years. Mr. Albert injured his low back in August, 1990, 
(Quality Plating), and January, 1991 (Barnard & Burk), resulting in 5% whole person 
impairment. On July 28, 1991, Mr. Albert fell from a building and shattered his right 
heel, causing the need for multiple surgeries, and causing a 9% whole person impairment. 
Over the next five years, Mr. Albert recuperated from his surgeries, and worked with the 
Utah Division of Rehabilitation. Mr. Albert was diagnosed with psychological conditions 
that included depression, learning disorder, written communication disorder, cognitive 
disorder, personality disorder, with borderline intellectual functioning. Mr. Albert was 
later assigned a 30% whole person impairment rating due to psychological conditions, 
with 10% undifferentiated industrial causes, and 20% that pre-dated his industrial 
injuries. Despite the legion of impairments (44% whole person impairment), Mr. Albert 
returned to work with Ameritemps. 
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On June 16, 1997, Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between a steel I beam and 
a pallet jack while working for Ameritemps. The crush injury required four toe surgeries 
including one fusion (failed), and a refusion, which resulted in 4% additional whole 
person impairment. As a direct result of the accident, Mr. Albert had new work 
limitations, and according to his doctor: "[Mr. Albert] cannot walk much except to and 
from work, should not be doing any carrying, lifting, etc." Combined with his prior 
impairments, Mr. Albert had sustained 48% whole person impairment, and never returned 
to work. 
At the Labor Commission hearing, the parties stipulated that Mr. Albert was 
permanently totally disabled, and the sole remaining issue was which accident, if any, 
directly caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. 
The ALJ found that the Ameritemps accident was the direct cause of Mr. Albert's 
permanent total disability. 
Ameritemps filed a motion for review, and argued that:l) the Ameritemps accident 
was not the direct cause of Mr. Albert's permanent total disability; and 2) the Ameritemps 
accident caused impairment, but not disability. Ameritemps did not appeal the 
Commission's factual finding that Mr. Albert sustained no subsequent non-industrial 
impairment to his toe after his Ameritemps injury. Nor did Ameritemps challenge the 
facts or law concerning its stipulation that Mr. Albert was permanently totally disabled, or 
that it was denied the right to rehabilitate Mr. Albert. 
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The Labor Commission denied Ameritemps' motion for review, and Ameritemps 
appealed to the Court of Appeals, and challenged both the "direct cause" of Mr. Albert's 
permanent total disability, and curiously, the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to hear 
Ameritemps own appeal. 
The Court of Appeals held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but reached 
its conclusion by applying the Union Pacific test. It also held that Ameritemps' injury 
directly caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. Ameritemps appealed again, this 
time challenging only whether this Court has jurisdiction over the ALJ's final order of 
permanent total disability in favor of Mr. Albert. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The central issue before this Court is whether Ameritemps stipulation to a final 
order of permanent total disability conferred appellate jurisdiction to the Court of 
Appeals. This Court should first look at the plain language of the Order to confirm that it 
was a final order of permanent total disability. The Order identified Ameritemps' duty to 
pay benefits and listed its appeal rights. But, the Order did not contemplate re-
employment or a second hearing because the parties stipulated to a final order of 
permanent total disability. This Court should conclude that the Order was a final order of 
permanent total disability on its face. 
This Court should hold that Ameritemps never challenged stipulation to a final 
order, and can not now restyle those arguments as "jurisdictional." Because it was a final 
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order, Ameritemps had the duty to present all issues on appeal to the Commission but did 
not. Ameritemps appealed only whether Mr. Albert was disabled by the Ameritemps 
industrial accident, and whether the accident was the direct cause of Mr. Albert's 
permanent total disability. Ameritemps failed to challenge the facts of its stipulation and 
lost on the merits at the Commission. This Court should hold that Ameritemps did not 
appeal its stipulation to a final order, and those facts can not be disturbed on appeal. 
After it lost at the Commission, Ameritemps changed its appeal strategy: It argued 
that the Order was merely a tentative finding of permanent total disability, and not a final 
order of permanent total disability. Having painted itself into a corner, Ameritemps 
challenged the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to hear its own appeal. Instead of looking 
at the plain language of the Order, the Court of Appeals glossed over whether the Order 
was a final order of permanent total disability, and applied the Union Pacific test to hold 
that it had jurisdiction over the appeal. 
The Court of Appeals got the right result, but for the wrong reasons. The Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over final orders, and the ALJ's order was a final order of 
permanent total disability on its face. But the Court of Appeals ignored the plain 
language of the Order, and mischaracterized the Order as a "tentative finding." In so 
doing, the Court of Appeals ignored Ameritemps' failure to appeal its own stipulation, 
and opined on the stipulation, even though those facts were not appealed. This Court 
should hold that because Ameritemps did not appeal its stipulation to a final order, it can 
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not now argue that there was no final order based on its stipulation. This Court should 
dispose of the case by affirming the Order for the reasons cited above, and award benefits 
to Mr. Albert. 
This Court should confirm that tentative findings can not be appealed under the 
plain language of the statute, consistent with this Court's prior holding in the case of 
Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt, 2004 UT 12. This Court should also hold that the 
Commission's Rule 612-l-10.C.l(c), which purported to expand the Commission's 
appellate jurisdiction to tentative findings of permanent total disability, violated the plain 
restrictions of the statute, and was void from inception. 
Even if the Court holds that the statute is ambiguous, it should still prohibit 
appeals from tentative findings for several reasons. First, the plain language of the statute 
shows that tentative findings are not final orders. Second, assuming the statute is 
ambiguous - and it is not - employees are deprived of a speedy remedy if this Court 
permits judicial review of tentative findings. Third, permitting appeals from tentative 
findings is contrary to the legislature's multiple serial hearing scheme because it halts re-
employment during the pendency of the appeals. Alternatively, applying the Union 
Pacific test shows that tentative findings are not final appealable orders. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE ALJ'S ORDER WAS 
A FINAL ORDER OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY, 
/L THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE ALJ ISSUED A 
FINAL ORDER OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY. AND NOT 
MERELY A TENTATIVE FINDING. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal because the ALJ issued a final order of 
permanent total disability. All parties stipulated to a final order that Mr. Albert was 
permanently totally disabled. Accordingly, the ALJ's Order held that Mr. Albert was 
permanently totally disabled from his June 16, 1997 industrial accident with Ameritemps, 
and that Ameritemps pay Mr. Albert "permanent total disability compensation." The 
Order did not schedule a second hearing to consider a re-employment plan because Mr. 
Albert was unemployable. Instead, the Order set forth Ameritemps' appeal rights. On its 
face, the Order was a final appealable order that awarded Mr. Albert compensation from 
Ameritemps. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal because the appeal was taken 
after the ALJ entered a final order of permanent total disability. 
R AMERITEMPS WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO REHABILITATION WHEN IT 
STIPULATED TO A FINAL ORDER OF PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY IN FAVOR OF MR. ALBERT. AND AGAIN LATER. 
WHEN IT FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE STIPULATION BEFORE 
THE COMMISSION. 
Ameritemps waived its right to re-employment by stipulation, then later waived the 
right to challenge the stipulation when it failed to appeal that issue before the 
Commission. As set forth above, the parties stipulated that Mr. Albert was permanently 
totally disabled, and only disputed which accident caused the permanent total disability. 
Accordingly, the ALJ's Order was a final order of permanent total disability on its face. 
Ameritemps did not appeal its stipulation to final order before the Labor Commission.1 
Consequently, it waived any challenge to whether the Order was final order of permanent 
total disability, or a tentative finding subject to additional proceedings. 
C Ameritemps' Jurisdictional Argument Flies In The Face Of Its Own 
Appeal. 
Ameritemps' jurisdictional arguments can not be reconciled with its failed efforts 
to appeal the merits of the Order. On the one hand, Ameritemps was found liable to pay 
benefits to Mr. Albert under a final order of permanent total disability, and Ameritemps 
appealed the merits of the decision. Having lost its appeal on the merits, it then argued 
that the appellate courts have no jurisdiction over its appeal. Ameritemps can not invoke 
appellate jurisdiction, lose the appeal, and then declare that there was never any appellate 
jurisdiction. Ameritemps position is indefensible, and this Court should deny its appeal 
because it appealed a final order of permanent total disability, over which appellate courts 
have statutory jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(2)(a). 
D, This Court Should Reverse The Court Of Appeals' Statements About 
Ameritemps' Stipulation Because It Was Never Raised On Appeal. 
Ameritemps failed to challenge its stipulation before the Commission, therefore, 
the stipulation was not properly before the Court of Appeals. The ALJ's final order of 
1
 It appealed only: (1) whether Mr. Albert was "disabled" by its accident, and 
(2) whether its accident "directly caused" Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. 
Ameritemps' Brief to Court of Appeals at 10 and 13. 
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permanent total disability was based on the parties' stipulation. Order at 5. The plain 
language of the Order showed that the parties' stipulation acted as a waiver of re-
employment rights: the Order was not styled as a "tentative finding of permanent total 
disability"; there was no invitation to submit a re-employment plan. Whether a party has 
waived a known right is strictly an issue of fact. Arts Vision Institute v. Wasatch, 2005 
UT App 326 1J17, 121 P.3d 34, 48. If Ameritemps believed that the Order misconstrued 
its stipulation, it had a duty to appeal those facts to the Commission. But Ameritemps did 
not challenge its stipulation before the Commission, therefore, the parties' stipulation was 
not before the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals should not have opined on the stipulation because it was not 
appealed. The- Court improperly weighed the evidence and offered its own conclusions 
about Ameritemps' stipulation. Ameritemps, 2005 UT App 491 f^ 13. Now Ameritemps 
seeks to rely on those statements as if it had appealed its stipulation. Brief at 12. But 
Ameritemps never raised this issue - either before the Commission or the Court of 
Appeals. Appellate courts may not weigh the evidence and offer conclusions on appeal 
where no party challenged the facts and marshaled the evidence, as required under Utah 
law. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah Tax Comm'n., 858 P.2d 1381,1383 (Utah 1993). This 
Court should reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion, and hold that the ALJ 
issued a final order of permanent total disability, that Ameritemps failed to challenge its 
stipulation on appeal, and thereby waived any challenge to the finality of the Order.. 
i 
E. The Court of Appeals Had Jurisdiction Over Ameritemps' Appeal From A 
Final Order of Permanent Total Disability. 
The Court of Appeals rightly concluded that it had jurisdiction, but for the wrong 
reasons. The plain language of the Order resolved the jurisdictional issue. Had the Court 
of Appeals considered the plain language, it would have recognized that the order was a 
final order of permanent total disability, and that it had jurisdiction over Ameritemps' 
appeal. The Court of Appeals did not need to apply the Union Pacific test under Mr. 
Albert's facts. This Court should hold that the Order was a final order of permanent total 
disability, and that the Court of Appeals properly exercised jurisdiction over Ameritemps' 
appeal. 
II. IF THIS COURT VIEWS THE ORDER AS MERELY A TENTATIVE 
FINDING, THEN THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS 
APPEAL. 
This Court should hold that the ALJ's Order was a final order of permanent total 
disability based on its plain language, and that Ameritemps failed to appeal the stipulation 
or any claimed right to re-employ Mr. Albert. Assuming arguendo, however, that the 
ALJ's final order could somehow viewed as a tentative finding of permanent total 
disability, then two results must follow: (A) This Court has no jurisdiction over appeals 
from tentative findings of permanent total disability because the statute says that such 
findings are not final orders; and, (B) The Commission's Rule that authorized this appeal 
was void ab initio because it violated the plain language, or alternatively, the structure 
and purpose of the statute. But, even if the statute were ambiguous, appeals from 
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tentative findings of permanent total disability fail the Union Pacific test. 
A. Tentative Findings Of Permanent Total Disability Are Not Final Appealable 
Orders. 
The statute does not provide for appellate review of tentative permanent total 
disability claims. The plain language of § 413(6) shows that permanent total disability 
claims are not final appealable orders until either the parties stipulate to a final order - as 
happened in this case - or until the steps set forth in (6)(a)(i) through (iii) are completed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)(a). Short of that, there is no final order of permanent 
total disability to appeal, and the statute only permits appeals from final orders. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(2)(a), and § 34A-2-801(2). 
R Even If The Permanent Total Disability Statute Were Ambiguous, It Should 
Be Construed To Ensure A Speedy Remedy, And Consistent With The 
Statute's Multiple Hearing Scheme. 
But permitting appeals from tentative findings of permanent total disability does 
not just violate the statute. Assuming the statute were ambiguous - and it is not -
construing it to permit appeals from tentative findings of permanent total disability would 
violate employees' right to a speedy remedy and contrary to the structure of the statute's 
serial multiple hearing scheme. 
1. Judicial Review Of Tentative Findings Violates The Purpose of The 
Act To Provide A Speedy Remedy. 
The Workers' Compensation Act "is a detailed statutory scheme that provides 
injured workers or their dependents a 'simple, adequate, and speedy means of securing 
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compensation' for injuries suffered in the course and scope of employment." Anderson v. 
United Parcel Service, 2005 UT 57 [^8, quoting Park Utah Consol Mines Co, v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 84 Utah 481, 485-86, 36 P.2d 979, 981 (1934). In workers compensation 
claims, justice delayed is truly justice denied. 
Permanent total disability claims like Mr. Albert's are reserved for the most 
seriously injured employees. Employees can only qualify for these benefits if they can 
not return to their jobs, or other available work as a direct result of their job injuries. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(I) - (iii)(1997). It is self-evident that permanent total 
disability claimants can least afford a lengthy adjudication or appeal process. Yet, under 
the Commission's Rule 612-l-10.C.l(c),2 employees who present a prima facie case 
before an ALJ at their first hearing, may have to defend an appeal that lasts years.3 If 
they survive that appeal, they can wait to learn if the employer chooses to retrain the 
2
 "A preliminary determination of permanent total disability by the Labor 
Commissioner or Appeals Board is a final agency action for purposes of appellate 
review." Utah Admin Code R612-l-10.C.l(c) ("Permanent Total Disability"). If this 
Court holds that the ALJ's final order of permanent total disability was somehow a 
tentative finding of permanent total disability, then it must strike down this Rule. The 
statute states that tentative findings are not final orders. The Commission's appellate 
jurisdiction is limited to "final orders." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(2)(a). The 
Commission can not expand its appellate jurisdiction to review tentative findings of 
permanent total disability because the statute expressly stated that these findings are "not 
final." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)(a). The Rule must yield to the statute, and this 
Court should strike this Rule. 
3
 For example, Mr. Albert's first PTD hearing was held on December 17, 
2002, and this case will be briefed by mid-August 2006. This appeal may not be decided 
until over four years after his first hearing. See also, Media Paymasters v. Martinez, 
pending with this Court (first PTD hearing over five years ago). 
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employee, then cooperate with the employer's efforts, and if they prevail after a second 
hearing, may endure a second appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)(a)(iii). 
Employees may defend multiple appeals with no money from the employer because there 
is no final enforceable order. Thomas, 2004 UT 12 ^ [25. Because this Court has 
recognized "the difficulty this may create for injured employees," Id. at [^25, it should 
interpret the permanent total disability statute consistent with the purpose of the Act to 
provide a speedy remedy for injured employees. 
2. Judicial Review Of Tentative Findings Violates The Statute's 
Multiple Hearing Scheme. 
This Court should also hold that judicial review of tentative findings violates the 
permanent total disability statute's multiple serial hearing scheme. Courts will strike 
down rules that conflict with the legislature's intent when it is expressed in a statutory 
scheme. For example, in Draughon v. Dep 't. of Fin. Inst., 975 p.2d 935 (Utah App. 
1999), the Court of Appeals struck down a rule that deprived public employees of their 
right to file grievances where the rule violated a statutory scheme of employment rights. 
In this case, Rule R612-l-10.C.l(c) contradicts the plain language of the statute, and the 
statute's serial multiple hearing scheme. Permitting judicial review of tentative findings 
of permanent total disability stops the re-employment process during the pendency of the 
appeal. This is contrary to the statute's scheme, where after the employee prevails at the 
first hearing, employers develop re-employment plans with a view to retraining the 
injured employee. Shutting down the re-employment process for several years during an 
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appeal violates the statutory scheme of employers working with employees to get them 
retrained and back into the workforce. This Court should hold that the Rule is void 
because it conflicts with the statute's serial multiple hearing process. 
C. Tentative Findings of Permanent Total Disability Are Not Final Orders 
Under The Union Pacific Test. 
The Union Pacific test did not apply to Mr. Albert's case because the ALJ issued a 
final order of permanent total disability.4 Like the Thomas case, the plain language of the 
Act obviated the need to apply the test for tentatively permanently totally disabled 
employees.5 Thomas, 2004 UT 12, ^ [13. But assuming arguendo that the ALJ's Order 
was ambiguous - and it was not - tentative findings of permanent total disability are not 
final orders under the Union Pacific test. Union Pacific v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2000 
UT 40^16. 
First, challenging a tentative finding disrupts the orderly process of adjudication. 
Id. The adjudication process contemplates possible multiple serial hearings with a view 
to re-employing the injured worker if possible. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6); 
Thomas, 2004 UT 12, %Ll. The statute allows employers to retrain injured workers, and 
pay them while they are being retrained. But where employers can appeal tentative 
findings, several years can pass between finding an employee permanently totally 
4
 See discussion, supra Part I. 
5
 Similarly, in this case, the plain language of the ALJ's Order resolved 
any doubt that it was a final order of permanent total disability. 
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disabled, and the next step, where employers submit re-employment plans. During the 
intervening appeal, employees receive no retraining and no compensation. Permitting 
appeals of tentative findings halts the entire retraining process, and thereby disrupts the 
orderly process of adjudicating permanent total disability claims. 
The second part of the Union Pacific test asks whether rights have been 
determined and legal consequences flow from the action. Union Pacific v. Utah State Tax 
Comm % 2000 UT 40 f 16. This Court explained in the Thomas case that no enforceable 
legal right to compensation flows from a tentative finding of permanent total disability 
because they are not enforceable orders. Thomas, 2004 UT 12, ^ 25. Where some 
employees can be re-employed by employers, the employee's rights (or employers' 
duties) may not be fully determined in a tentative finding: "Before becoming final, the 
initial finding may be modified as a result of the employee's rehabilitation or re-
employment." Id. at [^24. Where the parties rights and obligations are necessarily fluid 
until there is a final order, then tentative findings are not determinative of the parties' 
rights and obligations, and fail the second part of the Union Pacific test. 
The final part of the test asks whether the Commission's action is (wholly or 
partially) preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate. Union Pacific v. Utah 
State Tax Comm % 2000 UT 40 f^ 16. For employees who have been found "tentatively 
permanently totally disabled," the answer is clear: The statute contemplates additional 
steps by the agency before it can enter a "final order" of permanent total disability. Utah 
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Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6). 
Consequently, if the ALJ's Order were not a final order of permanent total 
disability, then this Court would have no jurisdiction to hear Ameritemps' appeal. But 
because the ALJ issued a final order of permanent total disability, there was a final 
appealable order. The Union Pacific test did not apply to Mr. Albert's facts. This Court 
should hold that the ALJ issued a final order of permanent total disability. But if the 
Order was only a tentative finding, then the Commission's Rule is void, and this Court 
lacks jurisdiction under the statute or the Union Pacific test. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should find that the ALJ issued a Final Order of permanent total 
disability and not merely tentative finding. The plain language of the Order showed that 
Mr. Albert was awarded permanent total disability benefits - not subsistence benefits. 
Because the parties stipulated to a final order, no additional re-employment proceedings 
were contemplated. Instead, the Order advised Ameritemps of its right to appeal the final 
order. Because it was a final order, the Labor Commission and Court of Appeals 
appropriately exercised appellate jurisdiction over Ameritemps5 appeals. 
This Court should find that Ameritemps waived its right to re-employ Mr. Albert 
when it stipulated to a final order. This Court should also find that Ameritemps failed to 
appeal its stipulation to the Commission. Consequently, Ameritemps cannot argue that it 
did not stipulate to a final order because its stipulation is not before this Court, nor was it 
before the Court of Appeals. Ameritemps' jurisdictional arguments were based on 
unappealed facts not before this Court, and therefore, this Court must reject its argument. 
This Court should hold that it has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal if the judge's 
order was merely a tentative finding of permanent total disability. Tentative findings of 
permanent total disability are not final appealable orders. Accordingly, this Court should 
also hold that Rule 612-1-10.C. 1(c) violates the plain language, or alternatively, the 
structure and purpose of the statute and is void ab initio. 
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